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$SULPHURQWKH6FRWWLVK3DUOLDPHQW¶VQHZILVFDOSRZHUV
what are they, how will they work, and what are the 
challenges? 
David Eiser, Fraser of Allander Institute, University of Strathclyde 
Abstract 
This article provides an overview of ScotlanG¶VQHZ)LVFDO)UDPHZRUN7KH)LVFDO)UDPHZRUN
sets out how the new powers devolved to the Scottish Parliament in the Scotland Acts 2012 and 
2016 will be made operational.  It provides a brief overview of the history of fiscal devolution to 
Scotland since the establishment of the Scottish Parliament in 1999.  From relying on a Block 
Grant from Westminster to fund virtually all its expenditure, the Scottish Parliament now has a 
range of revenue raising powers including substantial flexibility to vary income tax rates and 
thresholds; moreover the Scottish budget will in future be much more closely linked to the 
performance of the Scottish economy. In addition, the Scottish Parliament will gain a range of 
powers in relation to social security.  The mechanisms aQGPHWKRGVIRUDGMXVWLQJ6FRWODQG¶V
Block Grant ± %ORFN*UDQW$GMXVWPHQWV%*$¶V± the forecasting role of the new Scottish Fiscal 
&RPPLVVLRQDQG6FRWODQG¶VQHZFDSLWDOERUURZLQJUHVRXUFHDQGFDVKPDQDJHPHQWSRZHUVDUH
all outlined. .  Finally, the impOLFDWLRQVIRU6FRWODQG¶VEXGJHWSURFHVVDQGZKDWWKHQHZ
DUUDQJHPHQWVFRXOGPHDQIRUWKH6FRWWLVK*RYHUQPHQW¶VDELOLW\WRLPSDFWRQ6FRWODQG¶VHFRQRP\
and growth rate is discussed.    
I Introduction 
Substantial new fiscal powers are being devolved to the Scottish Parliament, as a result of the 
Scotland Acts 2012 and 2016. These powers include the devolution and assignment of 
significant tax revenues, and devolution of new social security powers. 
The devolution of these powers requires changes to be made to the way that the Scottish block 
grant is calculated. New arrangements for fiscal forecasting have to be put in place. And the 
Scottish Government requires more extensive borrowing and cash management tools to manage 
budget volatility and uncertainty. These DUUDQJHPHQWVDUHVHWRXWLQ6FRWODQG¶V)LVFDO
Framework, published in 20161. 
Implementing the new powers also requires substantial technical and administrative work, much 
of which is ongoing. And it will require changes to the way in which Scottish budgets are 
presented to and scrutinised by the Scottish Parliament. 
                                                            
1
 https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-agreement-between-the-scottish-government-and-the-united-kingdom-
government-on-the-scottish-governments-fiscal-framework  
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7KLVSDSHURXWOLQHVWKH6FRWWLVK3DUOLDPHQW¶VQHZSRZHUVWKHNH\HOHPHQWVRIWKH)LVFDO
Framework that enable the implementation of these new powers, and the technical and 
administrative issues that are still ongoing. It describes some of the budgetary opportunities that 
the new fiscal arrangements present, and also some of the risks to which the Scottish budget is 
now exposed. 
II Background to tax devolution in Scotland: how did we get to where we are? 
When the Scottish Parliament was established it had substantial spending responsibilities but 
limited responsibility for revenue raising (i.e. taxation). On spending, the parliament has 
substantial responsibilities in relation to health, education, justice and policing, economic 
development, the environment, and culture and sport. On tax however, only two relatively small 
property taxes were determined in Scotland ± the Council Tax (a tax on domestic property) and 
Non-Domestic Rates, a tax on business property. 
5HYHQXHVIURPWKHVHWZRWD[HVDPRXQWHGWRDURXQGSHUFHQWRIWKH6FRWWLVK3DUOLDPHQW¶V
spending budget, with the remainder of the budget provided by the block grant from the UK 
Government.  
The Calman Commission report, published in 2009, argued that this imbalance between 
spending responsibility and revenue raising responsibility was problematic. It noted2 µFunding by 
block grant alone means that while the Scottish Parliament is completely accountable for the 
spending of its budget, it is not accountable for the total of that budget or how it is raised; it has 
no fiscal powers that can be used as policy instruments and it does not have a direct financial 
VWDNHLQWKHSHUIRUPDQFHRIWKH6FRWWLVKHFRQRP\¶ .  
The Calman Commission recommended that this imbalance should be addressed through the 
partial devolution of income tax to the Scottish Parliament, alongside devolution of stamp duty 
land tax (a tax on property transactions) and landfill tax (a tax on waste to landfill). These 
recommendations were passed into legislation through the Scotland Act 2012. Scottish Landfill 
Tax and the Land and Buildings Transaction Tax (LBTT, the replacement for Stamp Duty in 
Scotland) came into operation in April 2014. The arrangements for the partial devolution of 
income tax only operated for one year, 2016/17, before being superseded by subsequent 
legislation. 
Following the 2014 Scottish Referendum, the Smith Commission was established to agree which 
fiscal powers to devolve to the Scottish Parliament. The Smith Commission3 argued that tax 
GHFHQWUDOLVDWLRQZRXOGPDNHWKH6FRWWLVK3DUOLDPHQWµPRUHDFFRXQWDEOHDQGUHVSRQVLEOHIRUWKH
                                                            
2
 Commission on Scottish Devolution, 2009, para 3.87 
3
 http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20151202171017/http://www.smith-commission.scot/wp-
content/uploads/2014/11/The_Smith_Commission_Report-1.pdf  
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HIIHFWVRILWVSROLF\GHFLVLRQVDQGWKHLUUHVXOWLQJEHQHILWVRUFRVWV¶DQGWKDWLWZRXOGµVWUHQJWKHQ
the Scottish ParliDPHQW¶VDELOLW\WRSXUVXHLWVRZQYLVLRQJRDOVDQGREMHFWLYHV¶ 
The Smith Commission recommended: 
x 7KDWµ1RQ6DYLQJV1RQ-'LYLGHQG¶161'LQFRPHWD[UHYHQXHVVKRXOGEHWUDQVIHUUHGWR
the Scottish Parliament. NSND income tax revenues account for around 92% of all 
income tax revenues raised in Scotland (and include the tax paid on income from 
earnings, self-employment, pension income and property income). The Commission 
recommended that the Scottish Parliament be able to vary income tax rates and bands in 
Scotland without constraint. But the UK Government will retain authority to determine the 
income tax base. This means that the setting of the Personal Allowance, and the way in 
which the pensions tax relief is defined for example, are determined by the UK 
Government. 
x That Air Passenger Duty (APD) should be devolved in full.  
x It also recommended that a share of VAT collected in Scotland should be assigned to the 
Scottish Parliament. Specifically, the first ten pence of Standard Rate VAT and the first 
2.5 pence of reduced rate VAT to be assigned to the Scottish Parliament. Given that the 
Standard and Reduced rates of VAT are currently 20% and 5% respectively, this means 
that under current policy, half the VAT revenues raised in Scotland will be assigned to the 
Scottish budget. 
x It also recommended the devolution of Aggregates Levy, in full. 
7KH6PLWK&RPPLVVLRQ¶VUHFRPPHQGDWLRQVZHUHHQDFWHGWKURXJKWKH6FRWODQG$FW 
III 6XPPDU\RIWKH6FRWWLVK3DUOLDPHQW¶VHYROYLQJUHYHQXHUHVSRQVLELOLWLHV 
The Scottish ParlLDPHQW¶VQHZWD[SRZHUVDUHEHLQJLPSOHPHQWHGRQDVWDJHGEDVLVRYHUWKH
next few years. NSND income tax will be devolved to the Scottish Parliament from April 2017, 
with APD being devolved in 2018 and VAT in 2019. The staging of the introduction of the tax 
powers largely reflects the time taken to resolve various administration and implementation 
issues specific to each tax. 
Table 1 summarises the extent of existing and planned tax devolution to the Scottish Parliament.  
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Table 1: Devolved, shared and assigned tax revenues in Scotland 
Tax Date of 
transfer/ 
devolution 
Revenues 
raised 
2015/16 (£m) 
Degree of control by 
Scottish Parliament 
Responsibility for 
collection 
Council Tax 1999 £2,100 Fully devolved; complete 
autonomy. Local government 
Non-Domestic 
Rates 1999 £1,900 
Fully devolved; complete 
autonomy. Local government 
Land and 
Business 
Transactions 
Tax (LBTT) 
2015 £416 Fully devolved; complete 
autonomy. Revenue Scotland 
Landfill Tax 2015 £147 Fully devolved; complete 
autonomy. Revenue Scotland 
Income tax 2017 £11,214 
The Scottish Government 
can set the rates and 
bands. But the UK 
Government defines the tax 
base and sets allowances. 
HMRC 
Air Passenger 
Duty  2018 £275 
Fully devolved; complete 
autonomy Revenue Scotland 
VAT 2019 £5,000 Assigned revenues; no 
autonomy HMRC 
Aggregates 
Levy tbc £53 
Fully devolved; complete 
autonomy Revenue Scotland 
Source: Government Expenditure and Revenue Scotland (GERS); author analysis 
A new Scottish tax agency, Revenue Scotland, has been established to collect revenues for the 
fully devolved Scottish taxes (LBTT, Scottish Landfill Tax, Aggregates Levy, and Air Passenger 
'XW\ZKLFKWKH6FRWWLVK*RYHUQPHQWKDVDQQRXQFHGZLOOEHUHQDPHGµ$LU'HSDUWXUH7D[¶
Revenues from the partially devolved income tax and the assigned VAT in Scotland will continue 
to be collected by HMRC. 
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IV 7KH6FRWWLVK3DUOLDPHQW¶VQHZVRFLDOVHFXULW\SRZHUV 
In addition to tax devolution, some devolution of social security benefits is also taking place. A 
number of UK-administered benefits, mainly related to ill-health, disability and care are being 
devolved to the Scottish Parliament. Spending on these benefits in Scotland by the UK 
Government in 2015/16 totalled around £3bn (Table 2). 
Table 2: Expenditure on social security benefits being devolved to the Scottish Parliament 
  Expenditure, £m 
  2015-16 
Disability Living Allowance 1,399 
Attendance Allowance 487 
Carer's Allowance 224 
Winter Fuel Payment 180 
Personal Independence Payment 315 
Industrial Injuries Disablement Benefit 91 
Severe Disablement Allowance 49 
Discretionary Housing Payments 13 
Cold Weather Payment 3 
Funeral Payment 4 
Sure Start Maternity Grant 3 
Total expenditure on social security 
benefits to be devolved 2,768 
Source: Government Expenditure and Revenue Scotland 2015/16 
A new Social Security Bill will be introduced in the Scottish Parliament imminently.  This will 
provide the framework for the establishment of a new social security system in Scotland. The 
implementation dates for any new powers will be agreed by the Joint Ministerial Group on 
Welfare. 
Additionally, the Scottish Government has already gained the power to: 
x create new benefits (except pensions) in areas not otherwise connected with reserved 
matters 
x top up reserved benefits  
x make discretionary payments or provide discretionary assistance to meet certain needs 
x amend some employment support schemes 
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x make changes to the amount of Universal Credit (UC) for the costs of rented 
accommodation, and the timing and recipients of payments. 
Since 1 April 2017, Discretionary Housing Payments have also been devolved. 
V Adjustments to the block grant for tax 
7KH6FRWWLVK*RYHUQPHQW¶VEORFNJUDQWIURP:HVWPLQVWHUZLOOFRQWLQXHWREHGHWHUPLQHGE\WKH
Barnett Formula. 
However, the block grant will be adjusted (i.e. reduced) to take account of the new taxes being 
devolved to the Scottish Parliament.  
+RZZLOOWKLVKDSSHQ")RUHDFKRIWKHGHYROYHGDQGDVVLJQHGWD[HVDµEORFNJUDQWDGMXVWPHQW¶
(BGA) will be calculated. The BGA is effectively a measure of the tax revenues that the UK 
Government has foregone as a result of transferring the tax in question to the Scottish 
Parliament.  
The process for calculating the BGAs is set out in detail in the Fiscal Framework4. 
The BGA is calculated for each tax separately, and consists of two elements: an initial deduction 
and an indexation mechanism. 
The initial deduction is simply equal to the tax revenues collected in Scotland in the year 
immediately prior to the devolution of the tax power. For example, if income tax is devolved in 
2017-18, the initial deduction is equal to income tax receipts in Scotland in 2016-17. 
But what should the BGA be in 2017-18 and any year thereafter? This is where the indexation 
mechanism comes in. Its purpose is to provide a measure of the rate DWZKLFKµFRPSDUDEOH
UHYHQXHV¶KDYHJURZQRUGHFOLQHGLQWKHUHVWRIWKH8.EHWZHHQDQGRUDQ\
subsequent year).  
The basic idea is that the BGA should grow at the same rate as the growth in comparable 
revenues in rUK.  
To calculate the BGA for income tax in 2017/18, the indexation mechanism (i.e. the growth rate 
of the rUK tax) is applied to the initial deduction. The BGA in 2017/18 thus provides an estimate 
of the level of income tax revenue that would have been raised in Scotland in 2017/18, had tax 
                                                            
4
 https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-agreement-between-the-scottish-government-and-the-united-kingdom-
government-on-the-scottish-governments-fiscal-framework  
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policy been the same in Scotland as in rUK, and had income tax revenues grown at the same 
rate in Scotland as in rUK between 2016/17 and 2017/18. 
How is the indexation mechanism actually calculated? During the development of the Fiscal 
Framework, there was some disagreement between the Scottish and UK Governments over the 
best way to calculate the indexation mechanism. In the end, a compromise was reached. Over 
the period to 2020/21, the indexation mechanism will be calculated according to the so-called 
µ,QGH[HGSHUFDSLWD¶,3&PHWKRG%XWWKHUHVXOWVIURPDVHFRQGPHWKRGWKHµ&RPSDUDEOH
0HWKRG¶ZLOODOVREHSXEOLVKHGDORQJVLGHWKH,3&HVWLPDWHV5. 
8QGHUWKH&RPSDUDEOH0HWKRGWKHFKDQJHLQ6FRWODQG¶V%*$LVGHWHUPLQHGE\Dtax-capacity 
adjusted population share of the change in rUK revenues. The population share LV6FRWODQG¶V
share of the UK population. Tax capacity is the amount of tax raised per person by a given 
V\VWHPRIWD[UDWHVDQGWKUHVKROGV6FRWODQG¶VWD[FDSDFLW\IRULQFRPHWDx (set out in the Fiscal 
)UDPHZRUNLVRIU8.¶V 
So under the Comparable Method, if rUK income tax revenues increase by £10 billion between 
DQ\WZR\HDUVDQGLI6FRWODQG¶VSRSXODWLRQVKDUHLVDQG6FRWODQG¶VWD[FDSDFLW\IRULQFRPH
tax is 87.7% oIU8.¶VWKHQ6FRWODQG¶V%*$ZRXOGLQFUHDVHE\PEQ[[ 
The IPC method indexes the BGA to the growth in tax revenues per capita in rUK and the rate of 
population growth in Scotland. For example, if rUK revenues per capita grow by 5% and the 
Scottish population grows by 1%, the BGA grows by approximately 6%6. 
What is the difference between IPC and CM? 
The principle difference between the CM and IPC indexation mechanisms is the way that they 
treat differences in relative population growth between Scotland and rUK. 
The IPC method has the feature that, if tax revenues per capita grow at the same rate in 
Scotland and in rUK, then the Scottish budget will be identical to what it would have been without 
tax devolution7, even if the Scottish population grows more slowly than the rUK population. In 
contrast, the implication of the Comparable Method is that the Scottish budget loses out if 
Scotland posts a relatively slower rate of population growth that rUK. 
To see this, suppose that revenues in rUK are growing only due to population growth ± revenues 
per capita are constant ± DQG6FRWODQG¶VSRSXODWLRQDQGUHYHQXHVDUHFRQVWDQW7KH&RPSDUDEOH
0HWKRGLQFUHDVHV6FRWODQG¶V%*$E\DSRSXODWLRQVKDUHRIWKHU8.WD[UHYHQXHLQFUHDVH%XW
                                                            
5
 For further details about how these methods work, see https://www.ifs.org.uk/uploads/publications/wps/wp201605.pdf   
6
 The precise rate of growth of the BGA is 6.05%, calculated as (1.01)*(1.05)*100 ± 100.  
7
 This is because, with equal growth rates of per capita revenues, the amount of tax raised in Scotland is equal to the BGA, so 
the two effects cancel out. 
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the IPC method ZRXOGQRWLQFUHDVH6FRWODQG¶V%*$DWDOODVWKHUHKDVEHHQQRLQFUHDVHLQU8.
revenues per capita, and no change in Scottish population).  
Over the period to 2020/21, the block grant adjustments will be calculated by both the CM and 
the IPC methods. Thus LWZLOOEHSRVVLEOHWRFRPSDUH6FRWODQG¶V%*$VXQGHUERWKLQGH[DWLRQ
methods. Over the period to 2020/21 however, it is the IPC mechanism which will ultimately 
determine the BGA. 
The method for indexing the BGAs after 2021±22 will be negotiated after the 2021 Scottish 
Parliamentary elections.  
VI ,PSOLFDWLRQVRIWKHULVNDQGUHZDUGVWUXFWXUHLQ6FRWODQG¶V)LVFDO)UDPHZRUN 
What are the implications of these BGAs? 
Remember that the BGAs for each tax are deducted from the ScoWWLVK*RYHUQPHQW¶VEORFNJUDQW
What is added back into the Scottish budget are the revenues that are actually raised from each 
tax in Scotland. 
 
 
The key implication of the BGA arrangement is that, if the sum of the revenues raised from the 
devolved/ assigned taxes is greater than the sum of the BGAs, then the Scottish budget will be 
better off than it would have been without tax devolution.  
This could happen under two circumstances: if the tax base grows relatively more quickly in 
Scotland than in rUK; or if tax rates in Scotland increase relative to those in rUK.  
Of course the reverse could happen ± Scottish revenues may grow relatively more slowly than 
those in rUK, in which case the Scottish budget will be worse off than it would have been without 
tax devolution. 
7KHSULQFLSOHRIWKHQHZILVFDODUUDQJHPHQWVLVWKDWWKH6FRWWLVKEXGJHWVKRXOGµbenefit in fulO¶
from policy decisions by the Scottish Government that increase revenues, and conversely bear 
the costs in full of policy decisions that reduce revenues. This is fine as a principle but the reality 
of the arrangements is that the Scottish budget bears in full the effects of any differential growth 
in Scottish revenues relative to rUK revenues, regardless of the causes of any differential growth. 
Whilst the Scottish Government would certainly hope to be able to implement policy to grow the 
Scottish economy and tax base, the link between policy and growth is often weak, and many of 
the factors determining tax revenue growth are only dependent on policy to a limited extent. 
Block grant 
Scottish 
budget 
Tax revenues 
raised in 
Scotland 
Block grant 
adjustment 
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At a time when there are structural weaknesses in the Scottish economy (arising in part from 
developments in the offshore oil and gas sector and its Scottish supply chain), these risks are 
stark. 
$QDO\VLVXVLQJWKH)UDVHURI$OODQGHU¶VPLFURVLPXODWLRQPRGHORIWKH6FRWWLVKHFRQRP\IRU
example shows that, if wages in Scotland grew just a third of a percentage point more slowly 
than those in rUK in one year, then income tax revenues raised in Scotland would be £50 million 
lower than the income tax BGA. If wages in Scotland grow one percentage point more slowly 
than those in rUK in one year (which is certainly not outwith the realms of the historic 
experience), the difference between Scottish revenues and the BGA would be £150 million. And 
of course if these differences were to persist over time, then the revenue differential would 
increase exponentially.  
6LPLODULVVXHVDULVHZLWKWKHVPDOOHUWD[HVWRR,PDJLQHWKDW6FRWODQG¶V/%77UHYHQXHVSHUFDSLWD
grow at 10% per year. This sounds great. But if the equivalent rUK Stamp Duty revenues per 
FDSLWDJURZDWSHU\HDUGULYHQE\DERRPLQ/RQGRQ¶VKLJK-end property market, the BGA 
for LBTT will increase more quickly than Scottish revenues. Hence, the Scottish budget would be 
worse off than it would have been without tax devolution. 
2IFRXUVHWKH6FRWWLVK*RYHUQPHQWGRHVQ¶WMXVWKDYHWRVLWEDFNDQGKRSHIRUIDVWHUUHYHQXH
growth. It can choose to implement policies ± relating to the devolved taxes specifically or under 
any of its other devolved competences more generally ± to grow the Scottish tax base (or to 
achieve other policy goals, such as a different distribution of income). 
This additional policy flexibility provides new opportunities to the Scottish Government to pursue 
an alternative policy agenda. But a clear complication is that there is a large degree of 
uncertainty about how particular policies might influence the future growth of Scottish revenues. 
Some will inevitably argue that reductions in the burden of taxation will stimulate growth and 
increase revenues in the long term, while others will argue that the most effective way to raise 
tax revenue is to raise tax rates.  
There are a large number of uncertainties about how individuals and businesses in Scotland 
might respond to particular tax policy changes. One of the impacts of the devolved tax powers is 
that we can expect more debates about the revenue effects of tax changes in future! 
VII Adjustments to the block grant for social security powers 
As well as making deductions to the Barnett-determined block grant for the new taxes, additions 
will also be made to the block grant to reflect the new social security powers. 
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7KHµEORFNJUDQWDGMXVWPHQWV¶IRUVRFLDOVHFXULW\DUHLQWHQGHGWRUHIOHFWthe expenditure foregone 
by the UK Government as a result of transferring each social security power to the Scottish 
Parliament. 
6LPLODUO\WRWKH%*$VIRUWD[WKH%*$IRUVRFLDOVHFXULW\SRZHUVLQYROYHVDµEDVHOLQHDGGLWLRQ¶WR
the Scottish budget (which is equal to UK Government spending on the benefits to be devolved 
in the year prior to devolution), and an indexation mechanism.  
7KHLQGH[DWLRQZLOOQRUPDOO\EHEDVHGRQWKHµ%DUQHWW)RUPXOD¶ZKHUHE\WKH%*$VLQVXFKDZD\
that the Scottish budget will bHLQFUHDVHGE\DSRSXODWLRQVKDUHRIWKHVSHQGLQJRQµFRPSDUDEOH¶
benefits in rUK.   
But for a transitional period to 2020/21, the BGAs for social security will be calculated according 
to the IPC indexation mechanism. This will calculate the change in ScotODQG¶VJUDQWIRUGHYROYHG
ZHOIDUHEDVHGRQWKHSHUFHQWDJHFKDQJHLQSHUFDSLWDVSHQGLQJRQWKHµFRPSDUDEOH¶EHQHILWVLQ
U8.DQGWKHFKDQJHLQ6FRWODQG¶VSRSXODWLRQ 
VIII Forecasting revenues 
As we have just seen, the determination of the Scottish budget will in future be significantly more 
complex than it has been in the past. In the past the resources available to the Scottish 
Government essentially depended on the block grant from Westminster. In future, in addition to 
the block grant itself, the resources available to the Scottish Government will depend on a 
complex interaction between the revenues from taxes transferred to the Scottish Government, 
and the revenues from the equivalent taxes in the rest of the UK. 
In order to set its budget each year, and in order to undertake medium term financial planning, 
the Scottish Government will need forecasts of the Scottish revenues. 
The Scottish Fiscal Commission (SFC) has been established to make the Scottish forecasts. 
Twice each year, the SFC will make a 5-year forecast for each of the Scottish revenues, and for 
spending on the social security benefits being transferred to Scotland. The SFC will also make a 
forecast for growth in Scottish onshore GDP. 
The SFC was established as a statutory, non-Ministerial Department in April 2017 and is 
operationally independent of the Scottish Government. It will produce its first official forecasts 
later this year (2017), alongside the Scottish Budget.  
It is important to note that the SFC is only mandated to produce a single forecast for each tax. 
This will be based only on stated Scottish Government policy. In other words, the SFC cannot 
produce different forecasts to reflect alternative policy scenarios. 
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Of course the Scottish budget is not only determined by Scottish revenues. It is also determined 
by the BGAs, which are themselves determined by growth in comparable rUK revenues and 
social security spending. 
In order to set its budget each year, the Scottish Government will not only need forecasts for 
Scottish revenues, but also need forecasts for the BGAs. The BGA forecasts will be determined 
E\WKH8.2IILFHRI%XGJHW5HVSRQVLELOLW\¶V2%5¶VWD[IRUHFDVWVIRUU8.DQG':3H[SHQGLWXUH
forecasts for social security benefits.  
In its budget documentation, the Scottish Government will need to set out the forecasts for the 
Scottish taxes alongside the forecasts for the BGAs. 
IX Reconciliation 
Although income tax is being transferred to the Scottish Parliament, collection of income tax from 
Scottish taxpayers will continue to be undertaken by HMRC. How then will income tax revenues 
raised from Scottish taxpayers be transferred to the Scottish budget? 
In drawing up its draft budget in any given year, the Scottish Government will rely on forecasts of 
the revenues raised from the Scottish taxes (to be made by the Scottish Fiscal Commission), and 
a forecast of the block grant adjustments for each tax (which will be based on forecasts for the 
growth in rUK revenues made by the OBR).  
The UK Government will transfer to the Scottish GoYHUQPHQWWKH6)&¶Vforecast for income tax 
revenues; these will be drawn down throughout the financial year, whilst the UK Government will 
deduct from the block grant the forecast of the income tax BGA. 
Once outturn data on income tax revenues are available, the forecasts of both Scottish tax 
revenues and the income tax BGA will be reconciled to that outturn. These reconciliations might 
work in the same direction and offset each other; for example, outturn Scottish revenues that are 
lower than those forecast may simply be offset by lower than forecast rUK revenues, and hence 
a lower than forecast BGA. Of course it is possible that the reconciliation of Scottish revenues 
and BGA works in opposing directions, resulting in either a windfall gain or loss for the Scottish 
budget once reconciliation occurs. 
A key point however is that outturn data for income tax is not available until 15 months after the 
end of a financial year. Outturn data for 2017/18 for example will not be available until June 
2019. These outtuUQILJXUHVIRUZLOOWKHQQRWEHµUHFRQFLOHG¶ZLWKWKHIRUHFDVWXQWLOWKH
6FRWWLVK*RYHUQPHQW¶VEXGJHWRIWKHVXEVHTXHQWILQDQFLDO\HDULH 
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Two points are worth making: 
x First, these long (3-year) lags involved in reconciliation mean that accountability for the 
fiscal effects of policy decisions will often spill across parliamentary terms. 
x Second, note also that the Scottish budget bears the risk of forecast errors made by the 
OBR for rUK income tax. For example, consider the case where thH6)&¶VIRUHFDVWIRU
Scottish revenues corresponds exactly to outturn, but where the OBR forecast for rUK 
income tax revenue substantially underestimates subsequent rUK outturn figures. In this 
case, an upward reconciliation of the BGA would have to be made to a subsequent 
Scottish budget.  
A similar reconciliation process will be required in the case of VAT, once this is assigned to the 
Scottish budget. 
)RUWKHµIXOO\GHYROYHG¶UHYHQXHVWKDWDUHFROOHFWHGE\5HYHQXH6FRWODQGUHFRQFLOLDWLRQKDSSHQV
slightly differently. Because the revenues from these taxes are collected in Scotland by Revenue 
6FRWODQGDQGPDGHDYDLODEOHGLUHFWO\WRWKH6FRWWLVK*RYHUQPHQWµUHFRQFLOLDWLRQ¶KDSSHQV
continuously throughout the year, rather than as a one-off event. For the BGAs, there will be 
reconciliations between the forecast for the BGAs and the actual BGAs (based on actual rUK 
outturn data). These reconciliations will happen on a monthly basis. 
X Resource borrowing and cash management 
The devolution of revenue (and welfare spending) responsibility clearly exposes the Scottish 
budget to the risk of greater budget volatility. As we have seen, the complex process by which 
the Scottish budget is based on forecasts of Scottish revenues and BGAs, both of which are then 
reconciled to outturn, means that the Scottish Government may face a number of cash 
management issues. 
The Scottish Government has gained additional borrowing and cash management powers to deal 
with this uncertainty and volatility.  
Under the Fiscal Framework Agreement, the Scottish Government will have the ability to borrow 
up to £600m each year within a statutory overall limit for resource borrowing of £1.75 billion. A 
fairly complex set of rules govern how these powers can be used in these different 
circumstances: 
x There is an annual limit of £500 million on borrowing for in-year cash management (such 
borrowing allows the Scottish Government to deal with the fact that the timing of the 
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collection of its devolved revenues and its spending commitments within a year may 
differ); 
x There is an annual limit of £300 million on borrowing to account for errors in forecasts of 
devolved taxes or welfare spending, and error in the forecasting of the BGAs; 
x There is an annual limit of £600 million on borrowing to address any observed or forecast 
shortfall in revenues or welfare expenditure where there is, or is forecast to be, a 
Scotland-specific economic shock (although there is scope to increase this limit, subject 
to agreement between the Scottish and UK Governments). The Fiscal Framework 
defines such a shock as periods when (on a rolling 4-TXDUWHUEDVLV6FRWODQG¶V*'3
grows (or is forecast to grow) by less than 1% and is also more than 1 percentage point 
less than growth in UK GDP growth.  
The Fiscal Framework also makes provisions for a cash reserve ± the Scotland Reserve ±which 
can be used to smooth spending and manage tax revenue volatility. The Scottish Government 
will be able to pay into reserves up to a total of £700 million and draw these down at a rate of up 
to £250 million a year for resource spending, and £100 million a year for capital spending. 
XI Capital borrowing 
The Fiscal Framework also specifies that the Scottish Government will now be able to borrow up 
to £450m annually for capital expenditure (the previous limit was £300m), within an overall 
statutory cap of £3bn. The Scottish Government may borrow through the UK Government from 
the National Loans Fund, by way of commercial loan, or through the issue of bonds. 
XII Administration and set-up costs 
The Scottish and UK governments are incurring costs in implementing and then managing the 
financial powers in the Scotland Acts. The revised fiscal framework sets out how the Scottish and 
UK governments will share the cost of implementing these powers. 
The UK Government will make a one-off payment of £200 million to the Scottish budget as a 
contribution towards costs, and transfer up to £66 million each year to the Scottish budget to 
cover ongoing administration costs. 
The Scottish Government is responsible for meeting HM5&¶VFRVWVLQVHWWLQJXSDQGRSHUDWLQJ
the income tax powers. The lifetime estimate of these costs is now forecast to be around £20-
25m, in addition to which there are likely to be annual implementation costs. 
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The Scottish Government is responsible for meeting all costs associated with establishing the 
Scottish Fiscal Commission (SFC), setting up the devolved taxes, and all administration and 
programme costs it incurs in creating new social security benefits or making discretionary 
payments. 
According to Audit Scotland8, by the end of 2015/16, the Scottish Government had spent £18.5 
million on programmes to implement the financial powers in the Scotland Acts. Most of this was 
to cover HMRC's costs in setting up and operating the Scottish rate of income tax. The Scottish 
Government budgeted a further £18 million for 2016/17 and £92 million for 2017/18. 
The Scottish Government expects that implementation will cost more than the £200 million than 
the UK Government will transfer to the Scottish budget, although it has not identified how much 
more. 
XIII Fiscal Framework implementation issues 
The transfer of revenue and social security responsibilities to the Scottish Government poses a 
number of technically difficult administrative challenges. Here we consider three of the main 
ones, relating to social security, VAT revenue estimation, and identification of Scottish income 
taxpayers. 
Perhaps the biggest challenge will be to transfer the social security benefits in a way that 
ensures that no Scottish recipients lose access to benefit payments, or see their payments 
GHOD\HG7KHILHQGLVKFRPSOH[LW\RIXQWDQJOLQJWKH6FRWWLVKHOHPHQWVWKH':3¶VGDWDEDVHV
should not be underestimated. Indeed the Scottish Government has noted that9µtransferring the 
devolved benefits safely presents a challenge on a scale unlike anything the Scottish 
Government has faced since devolution >LHWKHHVWDEOLVKPHQWRIWKHSDUOLDPHQWLQ@¶ 
Assignment of VAT to the Scottish budget will begin in 2019/20. Assigned VAT will form a 
significant part of the Scottish budget, so it is essential that estimates of VAT raised in Scotland 
are robust and reliable. But how will Scottish VAT revenues be estimated? The estimation will 
likely involve large scale surveys of household spending in Scotland (from which estimates of 
VAT revenues can be derived), combined with expenditure surveys of visitors to Scotland. As 
with any survey-based approach, the estimates will be subject to a degree of error. And the 
calculations will be complex, given the significant range of products and services that are subject 
to reduced rates, zero-rates and exemptions (including financial services). A VAT-assignment 
                                                            
8
 http://www.audit-scotland.gov.uk/uploads/docs/report/2017/nr_170323_managing_financial_powers.pdf  
9
 http://www.gov.scot/Publications/2017/04/9266 (Para 89) 
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working group has been established to consider these issues, and is expected to release its first 
report later in 2017. 
Working out Scottish income tax revenues requires a clear and up-to-date assessment of who is 
Dµ6FRWWLVK¶LQFRPHWD[SD\HUDQGZKRLVQRW+05&KDVXndertaken significant work to identify 
Scottish income taxpayers for 2017/18. But this is not a one-off task. Each year, as people 
relocate between Scotland and rUK (or between Scotland and overseas), records will need to be 
kept up to date. This in part relies on taxpayers maintaining their up-to-date address details with 
HMRC. 
XIV Changes to the Scottish budget process 
The Scottish budget is clearly becoming more complex and is exposed to greater risk. As we 
have seen, it will involve revenues and block grant adjustments, forecasts and reconciliations, 
borrowing and cash management, and so on. 
This additional complexity will require changes to the way in which the Scottish Government 
presents its budgets, and the information and data it includes. It will require greater awareness of 
the medium term budgetary risks and opportunities facing the Scottish budget. And it will require 
changes to the way in which parliament scrutinises Scottish budgets and associated 
documentation. 
Recognising this, a Budget Review Group was set up by the Cabinet Secretary for Finance 
Derek MacKay MSP and the Convenor of the Finance Committee Bruce Crawford MSP to 
FRQVLGHUKRZWKH6FRWWLVKEXGJHWSURFHVVVKRXOGHYROYHLQOLJKWRIWKHSDUOLDPHQW¶VQHZILVFDO
powers. 
The Group is due to issue its report in July 2017. The report will set out how the vast amount of 
budgetary data should be presented in future budgets, and is expected to recommend that the 
SDUOLDPHQWDGRSWVDPRUHµ\HDUURXQG¶DSSURDFKWRVFUXWLQLVLQJWKLVLQIRUPDWLRQ 
XV Conclusions 
6FRWODQG¶VQHZILVFDOSRZHUVEULQJVXEVWDQWLDORSSRUWXQLWLHVWRWKH6FRWWLVK3DUOLDPHQW7KHVH
range from the possibility of radical reform ± for example in the way that land and property are 
taxed, or in the way in which disability is assessed in the social security system ± to the scope for 
PRUHPLQRUWZHDNVVXFKDVWKH6FRWWLVK*RYHUQPHQW¶VGHFLVLRQLQWRVHWDVRPHZKDW
lower threshold at which income taxpayers become liable for the Higher Rate of tax).  
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One of the big challenges that the new powers pose is the substantial uncertainty that exists 
around how some types of tax (or social security) changes might influence behaviours, and thus 
affect revenues or expenditure. 
But even if the Scottish Government chooses not to vary tax policy in Scotland, the way that the 
Fiscal Framework is designed means that the new fiscal powers are likely to affect the size of the 
Scottish budget. The growth of Scottish revenues per capita must match the growth of equivalent 
rUK revenues per capita if the Scottish budget is to be at least as well off as it would have been 
without tax devolution. 
This structure is intended to incentivise the Scottish Government to implement policies that will 
grow the Scottish economy and tax base. But the nature of this set-up comes with risks. The 
relative growth of Scottish revenues will be determined by many things that are outwith direct 
control or influence of the Scottish Government.  This ranges from global developments in the 
offshore oil and gas sector, to a booming housing market in London and the southeast of 
England, to the long-term effects of policies administered by previous devolved administrations. 
The new Fiscal Framework arrangements also introduce a range of complexities into the budget 
process. A large number of factors will determine the resources available to the Scottish 
Government, including not only the Scottish revenues but also the BGAs, the repayment 
implications of previous borrowing, the position of the Scotland reserve, and so on. And there will 
be a corresponding expansion in the number of organisations with some role to play in the 
implementation and delivery of the devolved powers, including forecasting organisations like the 
SFC and OBR, tax collection agency Revenue Scotland, and the new Social Security Agency. 
There is still some way to go before some of the fiscal powers are ready for implementation. This 
is particularly the case for VAT and the social security powers. Effective inter-governmental and 
cross agency working will be crucial to enable a smooth implementation. 
The increased level of media and public interest in the Scottish budget and Scottish fiscal policy 
in the past couple of years suggests that one of the supposed benefits of fiscal devolution 
(greater scrutiny and accountability for budgetary decisions) has already been realised. However, 
LWLVOLNHO\WREHVRPHWLPHXQWLOZHKDYHDFOHDUHUSLFWXUHDERXWZKHWKHUWKH6FRWWLVK3DUOLDPHQW¶V
additional fiscal responsibilities have led to better policy outcomes in Scotland. 
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